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Abstract
We study the behaviour of the Betfair betting market and the
sterling/dollar exchange rate (futures price) during 24 June 2016, the
night of the EU referendum. We investigate how the two markets
responded to the announcement of the voting results. We employ a
Bayesian updating methodology to update prior opinion about the
likelihood of the final outcome of the vote. We then relate the voting
model to the real time evolution of the market determined prices as
results are announced. We find that although both markets appear
to be inefficient in absorbing the new information contained in vote
outcomes, the betting market is apparently less inefficient than the
FX market. The different rates of convergence to fundamental value
between the two markets leads to highly profitable arbitrage opportu-
nities.
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1 Introduction
Were currency and prediction markets efficient overnight on 24 June 2016 as
the results of the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum
were announced?
This question is important as the EU referendum was one of the great
political shocks of 2016. The results of the vote itself provide for a unique
period in market history for which both financial and prediction market effi-
ciency can be studied. The night is a special event for a number of reasons.
Firstly, referendums are rare events with no similar votes in history for mar-
ket participants to base expectations1. There was also a strong prior belief
that the UK would vote to remain in the European Union. This provided
fertile ground for inefficiencies and behavioural biases to arise. Secondly, the
EU referendum results was the only information to affect the market during
the hours of the night. There were 382 different voting areas and results were
announced and widely distributed at different times. This represented a drip
feeding of information to the market for a period of a few hours. Thirdly,
there are 2 markets to study, a prediction market in the Betfair betting
market and the pound dollar currency market.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) holds that financial markets im-
mediately reflect all available information in prices. If this is true, investors
cannot receive above market returns except by chance. The weakest form of
the hypothesis relates only to historical price information. Opinion is split
on whether this form holds. Stronger forms of the EMH relating to both
fundamental (semi-strong) and private information (strong) also exist. Most
studies conclude that the stronger forms of the EMH do not hold. For the
night of the EU referendum, one existing working paper (Wu et al. (2017))
concludes that the pound market was slow to reflect the information con-
tained in the vote results and hence the EMH in the semi-strong form did
not hold. Regarding prediction markets, there is a consensus in the litera-
ture that prediction markets provide better estimates of future events than
experts, and that the predictions of such markets are useful in a variety of
situations.
This paper makes a number of contributions: This is the first high fre-
quency study in the literature comparing a prediction market with a financial
market. We agree with Wu et al. (2017) that the EMH in semi-strong form
1There have only been two other UK wide referendums. The first, the European
Communities membership referendum held in 1975, would be of little use for inferring
voting patterns today. The other, on an unrelated subject, was the Alternative Vote
Referendum in 2011 and had a turnout of only 42.2%, opposed to a typical figure of
60− 70% for general elections
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did not hold in the currency market during the night of the referendum, but
we demonstrate this was also the case for the prediction market. Further,
we show that the Betfair market was more efficient than the sterling futures
market, which provides some support for the view that prediction markets
yield useful predictions. Small sample inference is required to predict Brexit
early on in the night of the vote and we improve upon earlier prediction
methods by using a rigorous Bayesian approach that is valid for small sam-
ples. Finally, we demonstrate that the different rates at which the vote was
reflected in the two markets led to arbitrage opportunities, implying a failure
of the EMH in the weak form.
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. The next
section reviews the literature. Section 3 discusses the data we use. In Sec-
tion 4 we present the electoral model updating methodology, which employs
Bayesian Machine Learning. Section 5 presents a theoretical model linking
the behaviour of the two asset prices (Betfair contracts and Sterling futures)
under standard economic assumptions. In Section 6 we present our empirical
results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
This is a study of market efficiency, and its manifestation in a prediction and
a financial market on the night of the EU referendum. We summarize the
debate concerning the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and refer to two
studies of referendums recently held in the UK. However a comprehensive
review of the field is beyond the scope of this paper. The reader is instead
referred to Horn et al. (2014) for a review of prediction markets and Graefe
(2016) for a specific review of political markets. There is a growing consen-
sus in the literature that political prediction markets are more accurate at
forecasting elections than are polls or experts.
The EMH (Fama (1965)) states that the prices of financial assets immedi-
ately discount all available information and therefore investors cannot make
above average returns, except by chance. There are various forms of the
hypothesis. In the Weak form, financial prices instantaneously discount all
market information; in the Semi-Strong form, prices instantaneously discount
all publicly available information; in the Strong form, prices instantaneously
discount all information both public and private, including privileged infor-
mation available to insiders. Many authors (eg Malkiel (2003)) argue that
the EMH does not imply that pricing is perfect or that mispricings never oc-
cur, just that mispricings are random and it is not possible to systematically
profit from them in advance.
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There are various behavioural explanations that attempt to explain why
the EMH may not hold. For a recent comprehensive review see Huang et al.
(2016). One such theory is that of investor inattention, which is potentially
relevant to us as results were announced outside of major market times. See
Hirshleifer et al. (2013), Hirshleifer et al. (2009) and Hou et al. (2009) for
examples, as well as DellaVigna & Pollet (2009) where the authors claim to
show that earnings announcements on a Friday take longer for the market to
react to. Other behavioural explanations include anchoring and systematic
overconfidence. Another idea presented in Caballero & Simsek (2016) pos-
tulates that a study of any anomalies of the EMH require an analysis of the
presence or absence of any arbitrage process that may exist to bring prices
rapidly back to the “correct” value. There have been many opinions and
studies published on the EMH and no consensus exists as to its validity. For
a recent review, see GabrielaTitan (2015).
There are many studies of betting markets and their ability to predict
future events including elections (Wolfers & Zitzewitz (2004)). A number of
studies have evaluated the efficiency of sports betting markets, mostly finding
some inefficiency (Goddard & Asimakopoulos (2004); Vlastakis et al. (2009);
Badarinathi & Kochman (1996)). There are relatively few studies of referen-
dums because they are unique events and require event-specific approaches.
During the preparation of this paper a related study was published (Wu et al.
(2017)) that investigated the real time response of the exchange rate to the
announced vote outcomes. Their conclusion was that the “Brexit result could
have been predicted with high confidence under realistic conditions”. Exam-
ining social and psychological factors as well as Betfair data prior to the vote,
the authors conclude that the mispricing “indicates both generic inefficiency
and a specific inertia / durable bias in the market similar to herding during
bubbles”. The paper also examines trading behaviour in the pound around
the announcement of specific results. We agree with the conclusion of a mis-
pricing in the pound market. However, there are some shortcomings to the
methodology. This concerns the use of OLS estimators with small number of
observations. These considerations are explored formally in B. We improve
upon this work by using a Bayesian electoral model valid for small sample
inference, by using real-time Betfair price data from the night of the vote and
introducing a theoretical model to relate the prices of the two markets. One
other study that uses political Betfair data is Wall et al. (2017). This study
does not examine the efficiency of the betting market but instead relies on
the largely accepted premise that prediction markets can provide meaningful
forecasts of outcomes. Betfair data is used to control for polling shocks and
isolate campaign event effects in the 2014 Scottish Independence campaign
in the months leading up to the referendum.
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3 Data
We first describe the data used:
• EU Referendum Results: sourced from the Electoral Commission (EC)
website (Electoral Commission (2016)).
• Timing Results: we use the earliest confirmed time for each voting area
from the three sources below:
– Press Association: the time, to the nearest second, that each result
was received and processed at the Association was used. This was
a small number of seconds after it was publicly announced at the
count.
– Electoral Commission: returning officers for each area both inform
the EC both just prior to announcement and immediately after-
wards. The EC has made both times for each area available to
us to the nearest second. This data set provides a window within
which each area’s result must have been made public.
– Bloomberg: 67 of the 382 results were published in real time on
the Bloomberg terminal and the timestamps to the nearest second
have been retrieved. Although only a small subset of the total,
these results can be assumed to contain the most market-sensitive,
and hence most informative, information.
• Priors for each voting area: Before the vote the psephologist, C. Han-
retty of the University of East Anglia, published a blog titled “The EU
referendum: what to expect on the night” (Hanretty (2016)). Expec-
tations and 90% confidence intervals (CIs) for vote share based upon
publicly available data could be downloaded for all but 4 of the 382
voting areas2. The work was reported in the media, including on the
popular financial platform Bloomberg. It is reasonable to believe that
market participants were aware of this information and had ready ac-
cess to it. The priors were based on a panel data analysis of the British
Electoral Study (BES) from 2015 and demographic results at the local
authority level. Firstly the priors are calculated directly from the BES,
and secondly, a uniform swing is applied to each area to bring the re-
sults in line with polling information available on the date of Hanretty’s
publication (7 June). Various assumptions were used to generate the
data set. Hanretty characterises them as follows:
2Northern Ireland, the Isles of Scilly, Anglesey and Gibraltar were excluded due to the
lack of availability of local authority demographic data.
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– the geographic patterns of the Leave and Remain votes have re-
mained constant since May of [2015] (though the levels may have
changed)
– that undecideds will break in roughly even numbers between the
two camps
– Leave- and Remain-voting areas will vote at roughly equal rates.
• We make particular use of YouGov’s poll on the day (YouGov (2016)).
We also use other polls where there are gaps in Hanretty’s priors.
• Historical General Election Data: we make extensive use of constituency
level data for preceding general elections from the EC (Electoral Com-
mission (2017)) and the website Electoral Calculus (Baxter (2017)). We
also use historical polling information and measures of their accuracy
for general elections. This was obtained from Wikipedia (Wikipedia
(2017b)).
• GBPUSD Futures Price: we decided to use the GBPUSD future price
traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange rather than the spot price.
There are multiple exchanges where the spot trades and aggregation
could be prohibitively difficult. It is well known that spot and futures
prices for foreign exchange are extremely well correlated and are ef-
fectively contemporaneous on time scales of under one second when
both markets are open. The data was downloaded from Bloomberg
and timestamps of trades were reported to an accuracy of one second.
Note that the futures contract was closed between 10 pm and 11 pm
on 23 June which was before the announcement of results.
• Betfair Data: The betting website Betfair listed two contracts. These
were traded on Betfair’s exchange platform which acts as a limit order
book. The first paid out £1 in the event of Brexit, the other paid £1
in the event of Remain. The sum of the prices of the contracts did not
deviate sufficiently from £1 to enable a profitable arbitrage. Betfair
supplied all trades with timestamps of one second granularity in both
contracts between 10 pm on 23 June to 5 am on 24 June. We convert
all prices in the Remain contract to a synthetic price in the Brexit one
by subtracting from £1. The resulting Betfair data set, along with the
GBPUSD future price, is shown in Figure 1. We conduct analysis on
the combined set of trades, which number 182,534. £51,016,907 in total
was matched during this 7 hour window. This compares with 88,246
trades in the GBP future during this time with a total notional traded
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Figure 1: The Pound and Betfair Markets Overnight for the Period of the
Announcement of Results.
of around $5.5Bn. Although the futures market is considerably larger
in notional traded terms than the betting market, the Betfair contracts
moved by around 90% of their price whereas the pound moved around
10%.
4 Electoral Model
In this section we present a Bayesian model for calculating an implied prob-
ability of Brexit throughout the night. A summary of the model is presented
in Appendix A.
4.1 Setup
There are n constituencies with fixed sizes which we label s1, s2, . . . , sn ∈ N.
Suppose pi,qi ∈ [0, 1] are the proportion of voters in favour of leaving the
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EU and the turnout percentage in constituency i, ordered by time. Then the
proportion of the national vote is:
pN =
∑n
i=1 piqisi∑n
i=1 qisi
(4.1)
and the event of leaving the EU occurs when pN >
1
2
.
4.2 Gaussian Copula Prior
The variables in the model are the 2n values of vote share and turnout of
the vector r = (p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qn)
ᵀ
, ordered chronologically. We use a
Gaussian copula prior. Given marginal CDFs for the unknown variables
F1(r1), . . . , F2n(r2n) the joint CDF is:
Pr(r1 < t1, . . . r2n < t2n) = ΦΣ0(Φ
−1(F1(t1)), . . . , Φ−1(F2n(t2n)))
where ΦΣ is the CDF of a multivariate normal distribution with zero mean
and correlation matrix Σ. We model the dependence between the variables
as via two-factors being vote share and turnout, with correlations between
factors allowed so that:
Σ0 =
(
Σp Σpq
ΣTpq Σq
)
,
where
Σp = (1− ρp) In + (ρp) iniᵀn
Σq = (1− ρq) In + (ρq) iniᵀn
Σpq = ρpq ×
[
(1− (ρqρp)) In + (ρqρp)iniᵀn
]
.
The correlation matrices Σp, Σq, and Σpq are all of size n× n and represent
the dependence between area voteshares (p1, . . . , pn), turnouts (q1, . . . , qn)
ᵀ
and correlation between voteshare and turnouts, respectively. The relevant
correlations are the same between areas and are ρp, ρq and ρpq ∈ (−1, 1).
4.3 Prior Probability of Brexit
Given Σ0 and marginal distributions F1(r1), . . . , F2n(r2n) an expression can
be found for the prior probability of Brexit (see appendix A.2). There is no
analytical form for the probability integral involved so a sampling method is
required for evaluation.
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4.4 Marginal Prior Distributions
Hanretty provided expectations and 90% CIs for the marginals. These CIs are
implied by responses of the BES coupled with Local Authority demographic
data. They do not take into account the uncertainty of the national vote.
There may be an argument that the distributions that Hanretty supplies
as part of his analysis of panel and local authority data are asymptotically
normal. No such argument can be made once the uncertainty of the national
vote share is taken into account. We interpret the prior as an expression of
a degree of belief about the possible values that vote shares could take. As
such, we are not constrained by the normal distribution.
4.4.1 Marginal Calibration
To calculate the expectations of the marginals, suppose that µH is the vec-
tor of expectations provided by Hanretty. Given an expected level for the
national average vote share µN , then expectations for each area i, denoted
µpi can be formed by applying a fixed uniform shift, αN to µHi , where µHi is
the expectation provided by Hanretty.3
We calibrate the marginal distributions by targeting a subjective level of
the prior variance of the national vote share σ2p equal to a generous estimate
of what we think it could be, say σˆ2p. Either way, we add a constant variance
σ2N to each marginal variance and adjust σ
2
N to achieve the result. We convert
the CIs as if the marginal distribution were normal:
(σ2H)pi = ((90% Confidence Interval)i/(2× 1.645))2,
(σ2H)i is now the unadjusted variance implied for the i’th voting area. The
national vote share is uncertain and treating this variation as independent of
the idiosyncratic variances implied by Hanretty’s values leads us to add to
each area variance a constant variance, say σ2N
4:
σ2pi = (σ
2
H)i + σ
2
N
3Note, Hanretty himself forms µ by applying a uniform shift to the priors he calculates
from the BIS and census data to agree with polling data at the time of his publication
4We are not implying that area vote shares are independent of the national vote share,
just that the idiosyncratic variation implied by Hanretty’s study of survey respondents
and local authority data is independent of the variation of the national vote share number.
Our assumptions are not even that strong; as we apply a uniform shift to variances we
are simply implying that the difference in the variations of the marginal distributions of
individual areas is the same as the difference implied by Hanretty’s study.
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The prior mean for pN is below 50% so the part of the national vote share
distribution that lies above 50%, which is the model probability of Brexit,
will be greater given higher variance σ2N .
For turnout we base area level expectations, say ν, on historical general
elections. However we choose the variances for each area to be equal and
labelled by σ2ν .
We consider the marginals distributions of the following types: Normal,
Logit-Normal, Beta and Logit Student with Location and Scale5. In each
case the hyperparameters of the marginal distributions are set so that the
mean and variance are equal to µpi and σ
2
pi
respectively, for each area i.
4.5 Update
Calculation of the conditional distribution is most easily done by a re-ordering
of the variables,
r˜ = (p1, q1, . . . , pn, qn)
ᵀ
.
Then
Φ−1(F˜1(r˜1)), . . . , Φ−1(F˜2n(r˜2n)) ∼ N(0, Σ˜0),
where for generic x, x˜ indicates a similar re-ordering of the rows and columns
of x. To calculate the conditional distribution of the remaining variables
after m results have been announced, partition Σ˜0 into four block matrices
as follows:
Σ˜0 =
(
Σ˜m,m Σ˜m,\m
Σ˜\m,m Σ˜\m,\m
)
,
where: Σ˜m,m, Σ˜m,\m, Σ˜\m,m and Σ˜\m,\m, are 2m × 2m, 2m × 2(n − m),
2(n − m) × 2m and 2(n − m) × 2(n − m) matrices respectively. The mul-
tivariate conditional Gaussian copula is also a Gaussian copula. Given the
observations p1, q1, . . . , pm, qm, write the data as:
x˜m =
(
Φ−1(F˜1(r˜1)), . . . , Φ−1(F˜2m(r˜2m)
)
.
Then
Φ−1(F˜2m+1(r˜2m+1)), . . . , Φ−1(F˜2n(r˜2n)) | r˜m ∼ N(Π˜\m, Σ˜\m)
5For the logit-student distribution the degrees of freedom parameters ν was set to 3.
This has fatter tails and logit(ri) will have infinite fourth moment.
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where:
Π˜\m = Σ˜\m,mΣ˜−1m,mx˜m
Σ˜\m = Σ˜\m,\m − Σ˜\m,mΣ˜−1m,mΣ˜m,\m.
As p1, . . . , pm, q1, . . . , qm is now known, the model probability of Brexit can
be computed via:
Pr(BREXIT)m =
Pr
(∑
i>m
[
pi − 1
2
]
qisi >
∑
i≤m
[
1
2
− pi
]
qisi
∣∣∣∣∣ p1, q1, . . . , pm, qm
)
. (4.2)
4.6 Model Properties
An advantage of the model is that it provides for closed form updates to the
posterior distributions of the parameters, as the Gaussian copula has a con-
ditional distribution. This avoids the need for a Markov Chain Monte Carlo
sampling technique to calculate the integral in equation (4.2). This would be
particularly arduous given the large number (764) of variables involved. An
alternative copula, with well understand and closed form conditional distri-
butions, is the Student’s t copula, Ding (2016). The conditional distribution
is also a Student’s t copula and will have fatter joint tails than the Gaussian.
The model describes the dependence structure of the unknowns in a par-
simonious way with a relatively few parameters. This leads to limitations. A
better description of the correlations of the variables could be found by using
more factors, such as the demographic ones used by Hanretty to calculate the
published marginal statistics. Heterogeneous correlation coefficients would
likely follow. However, we postulate that our model will capture the main
swing to the leave vote. We will perform robustness tests using some limited
forms of heterogeneous parameters to test this hypothesis.
We now comment on the expected qualitative impact of the model as
parameters change. For purely independent vote share results (ρp, ρq = 0),
convergence will solely be due to the results as they come in and the distri-
butions of the yet to be announced results will not be affected. For higher
values of ρp, convergence will be faster. It is expected that the value of
ρp and the variance σ
2
N will have the greatest effect on the speed at which
predictions change. The effect of ρq and ρpq on the model probability are
effectively second order. Given that we will be setting ρpq as negative and
turnout was above expectations, there will be some small second order effects
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from changes in the other parameters. Lowering ν or σ2v will slow the speed
of convergence whereas lower ρq and lower |ρpq| will speed convergence, but
these effects should be very small.
4.7 Parameter Choices
There will be a degree of subjectivity involved in the setting of the hyperpa-
rameters of the prior, particularly as the referendum was a one off event with
little historical precedent. We use both general election and polling data to
inform our choice of parameter values.
4.7.1 Turnout
National Turnout There were reports of high turnout on the day of the
vote itself (Gutteridge (2016)). We will use national turnout for general
elections as a guide, but note that the Scottish independence referendum
had an unprecedentedly high turnout of 85%. The general election turnout
figures since 1945 are shown in Table 1. The average is 66.9% (6.7%) and
for the last three elections the average is 64.2%. We use 67.6% which is the
three-election average weighted upwards by half the six-election standard
deviation. A reasonable range of expectations would be 65− 70%.
Area Turnout Voting regions for the EU referendum were not the same
as the constituencies used for general elections. However, the EC categorizes
both the 381 voting areas in the referendum (excluding Gibraltar) and the
(most recently 650) general election constituencies by 12 region codes. This
enables us to make a more granular estimate of turnout per area vi than sim-
ply assuming a uniform expectation. We use average turnout for each region
for the 2010 and 2015 general elections as outlined in Table 2. Similar to the
means of the expected vote share per region, (ν1, . . . , νn) can be uniformly
shifted to achieve the required expected national turnout.
Turnout Variance Instead of setting turnout variance by region we will
simply use the same level for every area and use the standard deviation figure
for the last six general elections; 6.7%.
4.7.2 Turnout Correlation by Area
Given elections in time periods t = 1, . . . , T and turnouts qit, if we have
predictions in advance for qit, q¯it, then we can model the prediction errors
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Election Year England Wales Scotland N. Ireland UK
2015 65.8% 65.7% 71.1% 58.1% 66.1%
2010 65.5% 64.7% 63.8% 57.6% 65.1%
2005 61.3% 62.6% 60.8% 62.9% 61.4%
2001 59.2% 61.6% 58.2% 68% 59.4%
1997 71.4% 73.5% 71.3% 67.1% 71.4%
1992 78% 79.7% 75.5% 69.8% 77.7%
Standard Deviation UK, 1992 - 2015 6.7%
1987 75.4% 78.9% 75.1% 67% 75.3%
1983 72.5% 76.1% 72.7% 72.9% 72.7%
1979 75.9% 79.4% 76.8% 67.7% 76%
1974 Feb 79% 80% 79% 69.9% 78.8%
1974 Oct 72.6% 76.6% 74.8% 67.7% 72.8%
1970 71.4% 77.4% 74.1% 76.6% 72%
1966 75.9% 79% 76% 66.1% 75.8%
1964 77% 80.1% 77.6% 71.7% 77.1%
1959 78.9% 82.6% 78.1% 65.9% 78.7%
1955 76.9% 79.6% 75.1% 74.1% 76.8%
1951 82.7% 84.4% 81.2% 79.9% 82.6%
1950 84.4% 84.8% 80.9% 77.4% 83.9%
1945 73.4% 75.7% 69% 67.4% 72.8%
Table 1: Historical UK General Election Turnout.
Region 2015 Turnout 2010 Turnout Average Turnout
East 67.5% 67.6% 67.6%
East Midlands 66.5% 66.8% 66.6%
London 65.4% 64.5% 64.9%
North East 61.8% 61.1% 61.4%
North West 64.3% 62.3% 63.3%
Northern Ireland 58.1% 57.6% 57.8%
Scotland 71.0% 63.8% 67.4%
South East 68.6% 68.2% 68.4%
South West 69.5% 69.0% 69.2%
Wales 65.7% 64.8% 65.2%
West Midlands 64.1% 64.7% 64.4%
Yorkshire and The Humber 63.3% 62.9% 63.1%
Table 2: Turnout per EC Region in 2010 and 2015.
13
4qit = qit− q¯it as being due to a national error ηt and individual error terms
it i.e,
4qit = ηt + it, ηt ∼ N(0, σ2η), it ∼ N(0, σ2 ), cov(t, ηit) = 0
Then for i 6= j, ρq is given by
ρq = corr(4qit,4qjt) =
σ2η
σ2η + σ
2

, i 6= j.
A regression of 2015 constituency turnout on 2010 turnout yields a coeffi-
cient of determination of 0.734 which provides evidence for simply using the
turnout of the last election as the prediction. We do so. σ2η is simply the
variance of the national turnout (6.7%)2. Calculation of σ2 requires looking
at errors at the constituency level for each separate election. As there was
the fifth constituency boundary review in 2008 we can form no easy predic-
tion for area turnout for the 2010 election because constituencies changed.
We simply use the 2015 election to estimate σ2 with predictions provided by
the 2010 election. This results in a estimate of 3.0% for σ and one for ρq
of 0.835.6 In the absence of any other estimate or information pertinent to
likely voting habits, this is what we use.
4.8 Vote Share
4.8.1 Area Vote Share
An expected national vote share µN is required. Polls with samples in the
week preceding the referendum are shown in Table 3, along with seven polls of
polls. For general elections, exit polls measure how people declare they have
voted on the day itself at a selection of particular, secret, polling stations.
They are much more accurate than any pre-election polling (Curtice et al.
(2011)), due to the fact that there is no measurement error of respondents.
There was no exit poll for the referendum as it was a one-off election. There
was, however, a poll on the day conducted by YouGov which was published
shortly after voting closed at 10 pm YouGov (2016). This poll measured
how people voted versus how those same individuals reported their voting
intention the preceding day. The result was a demographically weighted
result of 48.38% which was broadly in line with recent polls. As we consider
this to be the most accurate poll we set µN = 48.38%.
6Estimates based on sample moments are consistent due to the Law of Large Numbers.
14
Date(s) Remain Leave Undecided Remain Lead Organisation
22-Jun 55% 45% -- 10% Populus
20–22 Jun 51% 49% -- 2% YouGov
20–22 Jun 49% 46% 1% 3% Ipsos MORI
20–22 Jun 44% 45% 9% 1% Opinium
17–22 Jun 54% 46% -- 8% ComRes
17–22 Jun 48% 42% 11% 6% ComRes
16–22 Jun 41% 43% 16% 2% TNS
20-Jun 45% 44% 11% 1% Survation/IG Group
18–19 Jun 42% 44% 13% 2% YouGov
16–19 Jun 53% 46% 2% 7% ORB/Telegraph
17–18 Jun 45% 42% 13% 3% Survation
Polls of Polls
23-Jun 52% 48% -- 4% What UK Thinks: EU
23-Jun 50.6% 49.4% -- 1.2% Elections Etc.
23-Jun 45.8% 45.3% 9% 0.5% HuffPost Pollster
22-Jun 46% 44% 10% 2% Number Cruncher Politics
23-Jun 48% 46% 6% 2% Financial Times
22-Jun 51% 49% -- 2% The Telegraph
23-Jun 44% 44% 9% 0% The Economist
2.0% Average Poll of Polls
Table 3: Opinion Polling Prior to the EU Referendum. Source Wikipedia
(2017a).
4.8.2 Variance of Area Vote Share
Variances are chosen by shifting those implied by Hanretty by a constant
amount σ2N so that a generous estimate of the variance of the national vote
share σ2p results. Table 4 shows that the average error in opinion polls from
the prior week in the last six general elections was 2.66%. General election
polling is a well-researched field with plenty of historical precedent and would
provide far too confident a figure. As our aim is to produce a prediction based
on a conservative prior, we set σp = 5%.
4.8.3 Correlation between Voting Areas
We analyse general election data in a similar manner to section 4.7.2 to es-
timate ρp. We examine the variation at the constituency versus the national
level of the Conservative party voteshare to inform our choice of ρp. Pre-
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Election Average Poll (Prior Week) Result Error
2015 34% 37.8% -3.80%
2010 35% 36.9% -1.58%
2005 31% 33.2% -2.20%
2001 31% 31.7% -0.92%
1997 30% 30.7% -0.27%
1992 37% 41.9% -4.46%
σˆ 2.66%
Table 4: Opinion Polls and Vote Share for the Conservatives for recent gen-
eral elections.
dictions for the constituency level vote are based on applying the implied
swing from opinion polls from the week prior to each election, to the level of
the last election. See Table 4 for these polling results and for the results of
the last six elections. Complications arise due to Westminster constituency
boundary reviews in 1995, 2005 and 2008. These reviews change the number
of constituencies and their composition of voters. They occur periodically
in order to remove variations in the number of electors in each area, and
have tended to favour the Conservatives (Rallings et al. (2008)). This is a
well understood problem and the website Electoral Calculus (Baxter (2017))
publishes implied election results for elections preceding a review to enable
ready comparison; we use these implied figures.
The implied standard error of ση using the data in Table 4 is 2.66%
7.
Relying on the last six elections, the constituency level error calculation yields
an estimate of 4.18% for σ, implying a correlation ρp = 0.288. However, our
constituency level errors are probably estimated at too high a level as better
predictions for constituency level results exist although we do not have ready
access to them. For this reason, the value of σ2 is likely estimated too high
and ρp too low. Consequently, this value of ρp will be treated as a lower
bound.
The correlation ρp is likely to be the parameter with the largest effect
on how quickly the model prediction will converge to the true result. The
implied correlation coefficient, as estimated, appears to be stable. Using only
the last three elections results in an estimate of 0.324. The largest estimated
value of σ (5.69%) in any single election for the last six was in 1997, which
was (unsurprisingly) also the largest error in the national vote share. If we
combine this with ση = 2.66%, ρp = 0.18 results. This is an artificially low
7As the model implicitly assumes a mean of zero this is the square root of the average
of the squares of the error, not the sample variance.
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Figure 2: Change in UKIP + Conservative Vote Share versus Change in
Constituency Turnout at the 2015 General Election.
estimate and parameter values below this level are highly unlikely.
4.9 Correlation between Vote and Turnout
There were conflicting reports concerning the probable impact of turnout,
even within the same newspaper on the day of the result (Gutteridge (2016),
Foster (2016)).
Predicting how unexpected turnout affects results requires a successful
prediction of whether the difference in turnout is attributed to Leave or
Remain supporters. This is a difficult problem. It was well understood
in advance that younger voters, who are less likely to vote, would favour
Remain, and that Brexit supporters were reported in surveys being more
than twice as likely to vote as Remain ones Twyman (2016). YouGov were
widely quoted as suggesting the relationship between turnout and Brexit vote
share would be negative (see Foster (2016) for an example).
We take a quantitative approach based on general elections. Due to
boundary changes we are restricted to studying only the 2015 general elec-
tion as no implied turnouts for elections preceding a boundary review is
available. We proxy support for Brexit at the 2015 general election by using
17
Parameter Description Value Range
ν National Turnout 67.6 65− 70%
σν Turnout Error (6.7%)
2
–
ρq Area Turnout Correlation 0.835 –
µN Expected National Vote Share 48.38 –
σp National Vote Error 5% –
ρp Area Vote Correlation ≥ 0.288 ≥ 0.18
ρpq Area Vote and Turnout Correlation −0.361 –
Table 5: Plausible parameter values.
combined vote shares of UKIP and the Conservatives (the parties with sup-
porters most likely unsympathetic to the EU). We regress the swing of the
combined UKIP and Conservatives vote share against the change in turnout
at the constituency level for the 2010-2015 elections. Figure 2 shows the
regression, which results in a statistically significant correlation coefficient
of −0.361. This is indeed negative, agreeing with YouGov, and we use this
value. However, we note that there may have been beliefs that this parameter
may have been of different sign due to conflicting reports in the media8.
4.10 A Note on Model Correlation and Measured Cor-
relation
The model correlation parameters ρp, ρq and ρpq are not strictly the corre-
lations of the random variables r = (r1, . . . , r2n). They are the correlations
of Φ−1 of the quantiles being (Φ−1(F1(r1)), . . . , Φ−1(F2n(r2n))). When the
marginal is normal, Φ−1(Fi(ri)) will be a linear function of ri and the cor-
relations will be identical. When Φ−1(Fi(•)) is non-linear, a simulation or
other method would be strictly required to convert them. However, we omit
this step as it is not significant in practice.
4.11 Missing Priors
Of the 382 voting areas of the Referendum, Hanretty failed to publish priors
for four areas. These are listed in Table 6. The 4 areas are:
1. Gibraltar: This makes up a tiny 0.05% of the electorate, was the first
8The actual correlation observed on the night between voteshare surprised and turnout
surprises at the area level was around−0.1. Although turnout was higher than expected,
as was the vote for leaving the EU, at the area level, turnout was even higher on average,
for area’s with lower support for Brexit
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area to announce, and had overwhelming support for Remain (Reyes
(2016b,a)). As the population is so distinct from that of the rest of the
UK, the result is not informative. We therefore take it as given and do
not include it in the model.
2. The Isles of Scilly and Isle of Anglesey make up only 0.11% of the
electorate and are simply ignored.
3. Northern Ireland consists of about 1.26m voters in a total electorate
of roughly 46.5m. We use opinion polls for the mean and a standard
deviation equal to that of the average of the other areas. We use a
poll published on June 20 (Shapiro (2016)) that showed Remain 11%
ahead, or 9% higher than the rest of the UK at that time. We therefore
set the mean equal to µN − 9%.
Area Declaration (Actual / Expected) Electorate (%)
Gibraltar 23:36:33 / 00:01 24,119 (0.05%)
Isles of Scilly 00:49:42 / 00:01 1,799 (0.004%)
Isle of Anglesey 02:18:00 / 02:30 51,445 (0.11%)
Northern Ireland 04:37:00 / 04:00 1,260,955 (2.71%)
Table 6: The 4 Voting Areas with Missing Priors. Source Hanretty (2016).
5 Theoretical Framework
In this section we present a framework to analyse the efficiency of the betting
and pound markets overnight on the Brexit vote.
Notation
pN Vote share for leaving the EU
Pr(Brexit) Generic probability of Brexit
PBrexit True probability of Brexit
PBetfair Probability of Brexit implied by Betfair market
PGBP Probability of Brexit implied by the GBP market
T Time at which decision of referendum announced
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GBPt Price of GBP at time t < T
BETPt Price of Betfair contract paying out £1 in the event of Brexit at
time t < T
u(·) Bernoulli utility function
t Stationary martingale process
5.1 Assumptions
We investigate the implications of various economic assumptions which we
list in order of strength:
NS No persistent shocks to GBPt beyond those that affect Pr(Brexit)
EMHW The Efficient Market Hypothesis holds in the weak form
EMHSS The Efficient Market Hypothesis holds in the semi-strong form
CMI Conditional Mean Independence ofGBPt from national vote share
pN given Brexit
RN Risk Neutrality
Not all these assumptions are regarded as holding exactly but they are pre-
sented as an approximation. We discuss each one in detail below.
NS Simply put, this assumption states that the only fundamental de-
terminants of the GBP price on the night were the results of the
vote, and that those results only affect the price through their
effect on the probability of Brexit, Pr(Brexit). First we discuss
the validity that the only determinant of GBP price during the
hours under study were the referendum results. There are cer-
tainly other determinants of the GBP price over longer periods
of time, for example information regarding the nature of future
trading relationships that may became apparent after a negative
vote. However on the night itself, there were no major economic
releases, or other significant news events. In advance, the Econo-
day Economic Calendar (Econoday (2016)) listed the final market
moving news releases on the 23 June as the US New Home Sales
Report at 10:00 am Eastern Time (ET) and the first one for 24
June (beyond the referendum) as Durable Goods Orders at 10 am
ET. They predicted that the following would be the market focus
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for the 24th: “In a rare and potentially powerful wildcard, the
markets will react to the Brexit outcome”. This demonstrates
that in advance there were beliefs that the main determinant of
prices would be the outcome of the Referendum. Indeed, the au-
thors of Wu et al. (2017) describe the circumstances as “a natural
experiment” with “near perfect conditions” to study a situation.
Next we discuss the assumption that only the likelihood of Brexit
affects the GBP price. Before the vote there were several predic-
tions that the pound would sell off significantly in the event of
Brexit but rally a little otherwise (see Wu et al. (2017)). Thus, an
assumption that GBP decreases monotonically with Pr(Brexit)
is reasonable. This does not lead directly to the assumption that
only Pr(Brexit) affects the GBP price. For instance, it could be
believed that the vote share pN has an affect on GBP over above
the decision to leave the EU through the “hardness” of such a
Brexit. This would still be consistent with the NS assumption as
unless the support of the distribution of pN were entirely above
50% (P (Brexit) = 1) any move in pN would result in a, ceteris
paribus, change of Pr(Brexit). This is as, as the expectation
of pN moves further from the 50% cutoff, the probability mass
below 50% decreases and P (Brexit) decreases, at least for the
distributions studied in this paper. Also, we postulate that only
the binary result of the vote, and not the any particular form
of trading relationship following a vote, was on the minds of in-
vestors on the night of the vote. Despite there being intense
scrutiny of the negotiations between the EU and the UK on the
terms of withdrawal in recent months, the term “hard” Brexit
only first appeared several months after the referendum after the
Conservative party conference in October 2016.
EMHW When the EMH holds there can be an interpretation of a market
probability for a prediction market, as all information has been
aggregated into the price. The market price of the Betfair con-
tract can be interpreted as u−1(PBetfair × u(£1)). Correspond-
ingly, PBetfair, t = u(BETPt)/u(£1) where BETP is the price.
An implication of weak form market efficiency is that different
markets will have identical beliefs. For the purposes of this study
this means that although the two markets may have beliefs about
the outcome of the referendum which do not agree with funda-
mental information contained in vote results, they must have the
same beliefs and so PBetfair = PGBP .
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EMHSS EMH holding in the semi-strong form will imply that prices im-
mediately discount all publicly available information including
any results of voting areas already announced in the referendum.
As such Pbetfair = PGBP = PBrexit, the true probability. For our
purposes this will imply that market probabilities equal the prob-
ability of the electoral probability model. Note that EMHSS ⇒
EMHW.
CMI Let
D =
{
1 BREXIT at time T
0 REMAIN at time T
The CMI assumption can be written mathematically as:
Et(GBPT |D, pN) = Et(GBPT |D),
where pN is the national share of those voting for Brexit, while
T is the time when the decision is announced and t is any time
with t < T . Equivalently, the sterling rate is affected by pN only
through its affect on whether Brexit occurs. The GBPUSD price
would be expected to be the same if the vote for Brexit were either
50.01% or 99.99%. This is a strong assumption, particularly when
there is significant probability mass around outcomes very close
pN = 50%.
RN Again, this is a strong assumption which is not believed to hold
in practice, but it is a useful approximation that is likely to be
roughly valid. However, it is noted that any deviations from RN
may have larger effects than they otherwise might have due to
the increased risk of holding the pound during the period under
study9.
5.2 Implications
The implications of the assumptions are explored below and summarised in
table 7.
5.2.1 Semi-Strong Market Efficiency
Under EHMSS:
9Higher perceptions of risk were evident from, for instance, higher implied volatility
from options pricing as well as increased margin requirements from brokers for sterling
related products.
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Assumptions Implication
EMHSS ⇒ u(BETPt) = PBrexit, t × u(£1)
EHMSS+RN ⇒ BETPt = PBrexit, t
NS+EMHW ⇒ GBPt = g(1−BETPt) + t , g(·) increasing
NS+EMHW+CMI+RN ⇒ GBPt = GBPL + (1−BETPt)× (4GBP ) + t
Table 7: Assumptions and their implications in the theoretical framework.
PBrexit, t = PBetfair, t =
u(BETPt)
u(£1)
,
where t subscripts indicate evaluation at time t. The further assumption of
RN implies:
PBrexit, t = BETPt
5.2.2 Weak Market Efficient
NS implies
GBPt = f(PGBP, t) + t,
where f(·) is monotonically decreasing. Adding the EMHW assumption
which implies PBetfair = PGBP yields
GBPt = f(PBetfair, t) + t
= f(u(BETPt)/u(£1)) + t
= g(1−BETPt) + t, (5.1)
where since u(·) is increasing and f(·) decreasing, g(x) = f(u(1 − x)) is
increasing. Thus only NS and EMHW are required to imply that the pound
price moves contemporaneously with some non-linear but monotonic function
of the Betfair price.
23
5.2.3 Cointegration under Stronger Assumptions
Adding the stronger assumptions of CMI and RN will imply that for the
form of g(·) in equation 5.1 is linear and the markets will be cointegrated:
GBPt = Et (GBPT ) + t
= Et (GBPT |D, pN ) + t
= Et (GBPT |D) + t
= Pr (D = 1|Ft)Et (GBPT |D = 1) + t
+ Pr (D = 0|Ft)Et (GBPT |D = 0) + t
= Pr (D = 1|Ft) (Et (GBPT |D = 1)− Et (GBPT |D = 0)) + t
+ Et (GBPT |D = 0) + t
BETPt = Et (BETPT )
= Pr (D = 1|Ft)× £1
= Pr (D = 1|Ft)
Therefore,
GBPt = BETPt × (Et (GBPT |D = 1)− Et (GBPT |D = 0))
+ Et(GBPT |D = 0) + t
Write GBPH =Et (GBPT |D = 0), GBPL =Et (GBPT |D = 1) and 4GBP =
GBPH −GBPL and assume that these are constants, i.e., independent of t.
Prices at time t will thus satisfy:
GBPt = GBPL + (1−BETPt)× (GBPH −GBPL) + t
= GBPL + (1−BETPt)× (4GBP ) + t, (5.2)
where t is a martingale difference (if t were predictable EHMW would be
violated). Thus the two markets will be cointegrated with cointegrating
vector (4GBP,−1). Taking 4GBP as given, an arbitrage opportunity may
exist if the error term deviates from zero. This would be facilitated by
taking a position in the Betfair contract and taking an opposing position in
the pound, in the ratio of the cointegrating vector.
6 Results
Electoral Probability Model results were generated in Matlab, sampling from
the relevant multivariate distributions to evaluate model probabilities. Where
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calibration was required, we found that a simple gradient descent algorithm
was adequate.
6.1 Semi-Strong Market Efficiency
Figure 3 shows the results for calibrating the model prior to the generous
standard deviation figure of 5% using the parameters from Table 5. The
kurtosis of the distributions is lower for the normal model, due to the logit
mapping squeezing the distribution. The logit t-distribution has higher kur-
tosis, as expected. Both logit distributions are highly significantly different
to the normal distribution, as shown by the Jarque-Bera (JB) test pValue.
All marginals had a very generous prior 90% confidence interval of around
16.5% width. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the model forecast as the night
progressed. The results of all marginals are almost identical except for the
higher kurtosis logit-t marginal, which had a surprisingly quicker rate of con-
vergence. The logit-t model predicted Brexit at 1:23:34 am on the 12th result
with 95% accuracy, and on the 18th result at 1:45am with 99% accuracy. The
other models took until 1:43:46am (15th result) and 2:03am (33th result) to
get to those certainties respectively. This compares with the BBC projecting
Brexit at 4:39:32am10. The Betfair market took until 04:21:00 am to imply
99% probability, and the pound appeared to take even longer to react.
In section 5 it was shown that the assumptions of semi-strong market effi-
ciency (EMHSS) and risk neutrality (RN) leads to PBrexit, t = BETPt, where
PBrexit, t is the true probability of Brexit. This is rejected by the data. It is
theoretically possible that this rejection is due to a failure of RN and not
EMHSS. If EMHSS holds, but not RN then PBrexit, t = u(BETPt)u(£1) . To in-
vestigate this possibility, we plot the forecast probability versus the Betfair
contract price in Figure 5. Also shown is a polynomial regression constrained
to be monotonic and unity at a 100% probability of Brexit as well as the path
taken by the observed data. This would represent the shape of the utility
function under EMHSS holding, but RN not. The regression does not pro-
vide a convincing fit. There are many points for which there is a low price
for the Betfair contract when the forecast is implying a very high probability
of leaving the EU. The poor fit is explained as the paths of the contract
price and the likelihood of Brexit were not moving contemporaneously, as
evidenced by the path taken by the data not adhering closely to the regres-
sion. Failure of EMHSS is the only explanation for such behaviour, not any
non-linearity of utility arising due to risk aversion.
We now discuss the semi-strong efficiency of the pound market. We can
10According to our Bloomberg scrape.
25
Forecast Model Prior
Marginal Kurtosis 90% CI 99% CI JB p
Normal 3.0 (40.1%, 56.7%) (35.4%, 61.4%) > 0.5
Logit Normal 2.9 (40.2%, 56.6%) (35.9%, 60.1%) < 0.001
Beta 3.0 (40%, 56.6%) (35.5%, 61.3%) 0.29
Logit t 3.6 (40%, 56.6%) (34.4%, 62.4%) > 0.5
95% result 99% result
15 (1:43:46) 33 (2:03:00)
15 (1:43:46) 33 (2:03:00)
15 (1:43:46) 33 (2:03:00)
12 (1:23:34) 18 (1:45:00)
Figure 3: Prior Distributions for Forecast Model.
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Forecast Model Path
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Figure 4: National Vote Distribution Evolution (Logit Normal) and Model
Probability Paths for Forecast Model.
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Figure 5: GBP versus Betfair Remain Contract with Monotonic Non-Linear
Regression.
evaluate an implied probability of Brexit from this market under the addi-
tional CMI and RN assumptions. Figure 6 graphs the implied probabilities
of the forecast model and both markets. The forecast model leads the Bet-
fair price, which in turn leads the pound probability. The average horizontal
distance on this plot between the relevant lines is 113 minutes for forecast-
Betfair and 185 for forecast-pound. It appears that the fundamental infor-
mation (forecast) led the betting market by nearly 2 hours which in turn
led the pound by over an additional hour. Relaxation of RN and CMI in
the GBP market will lead to non-linearities arising between the price and
probability of Brexit relationships. Again, it is theoretically possible that
the relaxation of these assumptions, and not failure of EHMSS in the GBP
market, caused the apparent lag in the pound market. However, the next
section will discuss this further. A plausible explanation for the behaviour
observed is that the pound market discounted the information contained in
the vote more slowly than the betting market, whereas non-linearities in any
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Figure 6: The Forecast Model Probability, the Betfair Probability and the
GBP Implied Probability under RN and CMI Assumptions.
contemporaneous relationship caused by deviations from CMI and RN are
not.
6.2 Weak Market Efficiency
The evolution of the two markets on the night is shown in Figure 7. To the
eye, they do not appear to be moving together. To form a robust conclusion
we rely on the theoretical framework developed in section 5. Recall that an
implication of EMHW is that both markets discount the same likelihood.
Using the notation of the previous section EMHW ⇒ PBetfair = PGBP and
we explore this possibility.
Under the various assumptions of no shocks to the GBP price beyond the
referendum (NS), weak market efficiency (EMHW), conditional mean inde-
pendence (CMI) and risk neutral (RN) the two markets will be cointegrated.
We calculate the cointegrating ratio by evaluating both markets at the be-
ginning and end of the 7 hour period from 10 pm on 23 June to 5 am on
24 June. Following the notation of equation 5.2, this gives implied values of
GBPL = 1.345, GBPH = 1.499 and 4GBP = 0.154. This is similar to the
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Figure 7: Last Prices by Minute.
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Note: The error is the return, before transaction costs, of buying GB-
PUSD and selling the Betfair contract for Remain, in the cointegrating
ratio. There appear to be profitable arbitrage opportunities that require
no successful forecast of GBP
Figure 8: The Theoretical Cointegration Error with Sample Auto Correlation
Function.
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Figure 9: GBP versus Betfair Remain Contract with Monotonic Non-Linear
Regression.
predictions made of the pound conditional on the outcome of the referendum
made by various commentators in advance (see Wu et al. (2017)).
The cointegration error t = GBPt−GBPL− (1−BetP )×4GBP is plotted
in Figure 8 along with the sample Auto-Correlation Function (ACF). Testing
the Null of stationarity of the error with the KPSS test results in rejection
with a pValue of < 0.0111. This is a formal rejection of the assumptions
that led to cointegration, but not necessarily of EMHW. Relaxing the CMI,
RN assumptions made in section 5 but still relying on NS, implies that the
markets move contemporaneously, according to some possibly non-linear but
monotonic function of price g(·) plus a martingale difference t. Suppose
the rejection of cointegration were due to the resulting non-linearity due to
deviations from CMI and RN, what would the g(·) look like?
Figure 9 attempts to answer this question by showing a plot of the pound
11Testing a null hypothesis of a unit root via an augmented Dickey Fuller test using
the saturate and reject method of lag selection results in non-rejection of the null with a
pValue of 0.168. This provides further evidence of non-stationarity.
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price against that of the Betfair contract for remain for each minute of the
night, along with a polynomial monotonic regression which represents g(·).
This shows very little sensitivity of the GBP price to the price of the Bet-
fair contracts for prices between about 15p and 50p. This is unlikely. GBP
is most sensitive when the likelihood of Brexit is deemed high. This corre-
sponds to the period of the night when the betting market was pricing a high
probability of leaving the EU, but that the GBP had yet to react fully. A
better explanation is that the pound market had not discounted the result
of the vote whereas the betting market had. Further, figure 10 shows how
the error of this regression varies with time as well as the autocorrelation
function. The assumptions of NS and EMHW imply that this error should
be a stationary martingale difference. Stationarity is rejected by the KPSS
test with a pValue of 0.0112 and the ACF has highly significant lags which
would in themselves be a rejection of EMHW.
Discounting non-linearities in the price relationship as the cause of rejection
of cointegration leads us to consider violations of NS as the only defence
against a conclusion that PBetfair 6= PGBP . What would need to be assumed
for the EMHW to actually hold? One would have to believe that there was
a shock to the pound that caused a change in price of 9 cents, or around
7%, which was independent of the referendum results and which was subse-
quently reversed around 2 hours later, at around the time that Brexit became
apparent. This is not plausible. Finally, we consider the case that pound
investors could have marked down the price of sterling after the vote to leave
the EU was known, but that the exact voteshare, and hence likely “hard-
ness” of Brexit, was not. As can be seen from figure 4 the forecast model’s
expectation of the voteshare pN actually peaked prior to 2am above 53%.
It then decreased to the actual result of 51.9% during the rest of the night.
To the extent that the voteshare had any effect at all beyond being either
side of 50% it would suggest a softening of Brexit towards the final hours of
the night. This would support GBP not exacerbate a sell-off. The only con-
vincing explanation for the rejection of cointegration is that the referendum
shocks were first felt in the betting market and later in the currency market
and we conclude that EMHW was indeed violated.
6.3 Arbitrage
It appears that Betfair market led the pound market which suggests that
a portfolio of selling the pound and buying the Betfair contract would be
12Evidence of non-stationarity is not as strong as in the cointegration case as the ADF
test does reject a null of a unit root with a pValue of 0.047, whereas the Variance Ratio
test barely avoids rejecting a unit root with a pValue of 0.071.
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Figure 10: Non-Linear Regression Error with Sample Auto Correlation Func-
tion.
profitable. Note that the cointegration error shown in figure 8 is the return
of the portfolio generated by buying £1 and selling 4GBP Betfair Brexit
contracts. Selling in this ratio at around 4 am that would have made roughly
9 cents of profit per £1 of the pound sold, or an unleveraged return of up
to 7% in about two hours13. Supporters of the EMH could object to the
conclusion that the EMH fails by simply selling the pound uncovered due to
the increased risk an investor would be being exposed to (the pound, after all,
was exceptionally volatile during the period). However, the arbitrage strategy
of covering the short with a position in the spread bet largely eliminates risk.
The arbitrage is not reliant on the forecast model predictions and further
illustrates the failure of the EMH in its weak form.
6.4 Robustness Checks
We now consider the sensitivity of the electoral model to changes in the
model parameter changes. Table 8 shows the 95% Brexit prediction times
for various parameter changes. No changes are observed when making all
parameters except σp and ρp more conservative by roughly 5% (row 1). In-
creasing only σp by 5% or reducing ρp by 5% (rows 2 and 3) reduces the
speed of convergence a little with the 95% prediction coming on the 16th as
opposed to 15th result. Lowering ρp further to the very conservative lower
bound of 0.18 slows the result significantly but still predicts Brexit with 99%
13In terms of transaction costs, selling the pound would cost about 2-3 hundredths of
a cent at that time, whereas the Betfair cost is 3 − 5% levied on any bets that pay out.
This would slightly change the ratio of the portfolio but not significantly affect profits or
these conclusions.
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probability about an hour and a half before the Betfair market. Making the
correlation between vote share and turnout at the area level ρpq both zero or
of opposite sign increases the speed of convergence a little, with the 95% like-
lihood now coming on the 14th result. This suggests, although there is some
subjectivity in the hyperparameter choices, the conclusions of violations of
markets efficiency are both robust to sensible changes as well as completely
changing the sign of ρpq. Further we observe that changes to σp and ρp only
meaningfully affect the model to a large degree, which is as expected.
Heterogeneous correlations
As noted, the electoral model is limited by having homogeneous correlation
coefficients. To test this limitation we ran the model with a modified vote-
share correlation matrix Σp. Correlations were set so that they were higher
for areas with similar expected vote share, according to the following formula:
(Σp)ij = A − B
√
|µi − µj|,
where A and B are constants chosen so that the average correlation is the
usual value of ρp = 0.288 and the minimum value was 0.1. This form,
although crude, is justified as areas with closer expectations are more likely
demographically similar and so have a greater degree of dependence. Running
this model for normal marginals resulted in 95% and 99% likelihoods of Brexit
at 1:15 am (10th result) and 1:17 am (11th result), respectively. This was
considerably faster than the homogeneous case, suggesting that departures
from homogeneity in the model would quicken convergence and lead to a
strengthening of our conclusions.
7 Conclusion
This paper examined the efficiency of the Betfair and pound/dollar markets
as the results of the United Kingdom European Union membership referen-
dum were announced. This event provided a unique opportunity to study the
interaction between a flow of information, a prediction market and a financial
market, where there was a sole, public determinant of prices. Other work
has identified the pound market as being inefficient during the period under
investigation but we were able to answer questions about the efficiency of
the prediction market as well as the relative speed at which the two markets
digested the information flow.
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Result σP ρp ρq ρpq ν σν 95% result
a
1 b 5% 0.288 0.877 −0.379 64.2% 6.4% 15 (1:43:46)
2 c 5% 0.274 0.835 −0.361 67.6% 6.7% 15 (1:43:46)
3 d 5.3% 0.288 0.835 −0.361 67.6% 6.7% 16 (1:44:57)∗
4 e 5% 0.18 0.835 −0.361 67.6% 6.7% 34 (2:05:00)∗
5 f 5.3% 0.288 0.835 0 67.6% 6.7% 14 (1:34:21)∗
6 g 5.3% 0.288 0.835 0.361 67.6% 6.7% 14 (1:34:21)∗
a*Indicates a change from initial values
bResult 1 changes all parameters except ρp and σp.
cResult 2 changes ρp only.
dResult 3 changes σp only.
eResult 4 sets ρp at the lower limit of our plausible range, 0.18.
fResult 5 sets ρpq = 0.
gResult 6 changes the sign of ρpq.
Table 8: How the Times to Predict Brexit Vary with More Conservative
Parameter Values (Normal Marginal).
We have presented a rigorous Bayesian real-time model of the probabil-
ity of Brexit for the period under consideration. This is based on a copula
that is not constrained to normal distributions. The Bayesian method im-
proves upon earlier estimation methods as it does not rely on any asymptotic
properties of estimators for small samples We also demonstrate robustness of
results to changes in the prior. The conclusions of the model are as follows:
1. Not only was the currency market informationally inefficient so too
was the betting market, and both markets violated semi-strong EMH
on the night of the vote.
2. The betting market, although inefficient, was more efficient than the
currency market. The betting market took less than 2 hours to reflect
the information contained in the vote whereas the currency market took
over 3 hours.
3. There was a close to risk-free arbitrage opportunity in the two markets.
The arbitrage result suggests that a violation of EMH in the weak form
has occurred. The conclusion that there is a failure of the weak form
of the hypothesis is not reliant on any flow of fundamental information
or the electoral probability model.
Our results suggest that market participants suffered a behavioural bias as
the results unfolded. It appears that traders and gamblers simply could not
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believe that the UK was voting to leave the EU. Further, it appears that on
this occasion the betting market, although slow, adjusted much more quickly
than the financial markets. Any future possible UK referendum on this
subject will present an opportunity to study whether this inefficiency persists
or whether efficient behaviour is exhibited, possibly due to the publication of
this and other studies. If an inefficiency were to persist it would be interesting
to observe whether the betting markets again lead the financial markets.
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A Model summary
A.1 Variables
pi, qi, si : Voting area vote percentage, turnout and size, order by time of
announcement
pn, µN : National vote share and prior mean for Brexit
σ2P , σˆ
2
P : National vote share prior variance and estimate, for Brexit
µpi : Expectation of pi
µH : Vector of expectations provided by Hanretty study
σ2pi : Marginal variance of pi
υi : Expectation of qi
σ2υ : Marginal variance of qi, independent of i
r : Vector of variables = (p1, . . . , pn, q1, . . . , qn)
ᵀ
r˜ : Re-ordered vector by time of announcement= (p1, q1, . . . , pn, qn)
ᵀ
Fi, F˜i : Marginal CDFs of i’th components of r and r˜
ρθ, ρφ : Inter-area prior vote share and turnout correlation
ρθφ : Intra-area prior vote and turnout correlation
Σ0 : Covariance matrix of copula prior
Σ˜0 : Covariance matrix of copula prior with sequentially reordered
rows and columns
Π˜ : Mean of prior after the announcement of m results
Σ˜ : Covariance matrix of prior after the announcement of m results
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A.2 Prior Probability of Brexit
P (BREXIT)0 = P
(∑
i piqisi∑
i qisi
> 1
2
)
Φ−1(F1(r1)), . . . , Φ−1(F2n(r2n)) ∼ N(0,Σ0)
Σ0 =
(
Σp Σpq
ΣTpq Σq
)
Σp = (1− ρp) In + (ρp) ini′n
Σq = (1− ρq) In + (ρq) ini′n
Σpq = ρpq × [(1− (ρqρp)) In + (ρqρp)ini′n]
A.3 Prior Marginal Calibration
µp = µH + αN × i
σ2pi = (σ
2
H)i + σ
2
N
σ2N , αN : E(pN) = µN , σP = σˆ
2
P
A.4 Update
Σ˜0 =
(
Σ˜m,m Σ˜m, 6m
Σ˜6m,m Σ˜6m, 6m
)
x˜m = (Fp1(p1), Fq1(q1), . . . , Fpm(pm), Fpm(qm))
′
Π˜6m = Σ˜6m,mΣ˜−1m,mx˜m
Σ˜6m = Σ˜6m, 6m − Σ˜6m,mΣ˜−1m,mΣ˜m, 6m
P (BREXIT)m = P
(∑
i>m piqisi∑
i qisi
> 1
2
−
∑
i≤m piqisi∑
i qisi
)
Φ−1(F˜2m+1(r˜2m+1)), . . . , Φ−1(F˜2n(r˜2n))|x˜m ∼ N(Π˜6m, Σ˜6m)
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B Review of Probability Model in Wu et al.
(2017)
The model under consideration in Wu et al. (2017) performs (in the one
factor case) the following Weighted Least Squares regression following the
announcement of k results
pi = αµi + β + i, i ∼ N(0, σ2 ) i = 1, . . . , k.
The national vote share and thus the probability of Brexit is then simu-
lated by generating M realisations and evaluating the relevant sum. A correct
application of this method would involve sampling unknowns (α, β, σ2 ) from
the joint distribution
N
((
αˆ
βˆ
)
,
(
σˆ2α ραβσˆασˆβ
ραβσˆασˆβ σˆ
2
β
))
, χ2(k − 2),
where the slope and the intercept from linear regression are mutually cor-
related. Then the correct covariance and variance of unannounced results
would be:
cov(pi, pj) = E(α,β,σ2 )
[
cov(pi, pj|α, β, σ2 )
]
+ cov(α,β,σ2 )
[
E(pi|α, β, σ2 ), E(pj|α, β, σ2 )
]
= cov(α,β,σ2 ) [αµi + β, αµj + β]
= µiµjσˆ
2
α + σˆ
2
β + [(µi + µj)ραβσˆασˆβ]
var(pi) = σˆ
2
 + µiµjσˆ
2
α + σˆ
2
β + [(µi + µj)ραβσˆασˆβ] . (B.1)
However, an assumption that αˆ and βˆ are uncorrelated appears to be
used when in fact they are close to being perfectly anti-correlated with14
ραβ =
−∑k1 µi√
n
∑k
1 µ
2
i
= − µ¯√
µ¯2
≈ −1.
The calculation in Wu et al. (2017) would thus be calculating the variance
structure of the unknown referendum results as:
cov(pi, pj) = µiµjσˆ
2
α + σˆ
2
β
var(pi) = σ
2
 + µiµjσˆ
2
α + σˆ
2
β,
14A simulation of their results yielded ραβ ∈ (−0.97,−1).
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which is different to the values in equation B.1.
Another issue with the method is that the assumption of a normal distri-
bution for (αˆ, βˆ) with correctly specified errors is highly questionable, par-
ticularly in small samples. (αˆ, βˆ) only follows such a distribution in finite
samples if the errors are normal, and if not, it would be biased but consistent.
The normal distribution is an asymptotic result for non-normal errors, and
even then a correct evaluation assumes no heteroskedasticity; otherwise error
estimates are likely to be too low and implied probabilities of Brexit to be
too confident. This could be overcome using robust errors, but only for large
data sets. Using robust errors in small samples can produce severely biased
estimators.
The model in Wu et al. (2017) and that presented in this paper use
different approaches to estimate the covariance structure of the conditional
distributions used to form predictions. That of Wu et al. (2017) requires no
prior (beyond expectations) and attempts to infer the covariance structure
from an OLS regression of results announced so far. Our model, by contrast,
starts with a prior for the covariance structure and updates that prior as re-
sults come in. Both methods will produce the same covariance and results in
larger samples but will be different for small samples. The different approach
is illustrative of the differences between a Frequentist and Bayesian approach
to inference. However, we suggest that the Frequentist approach presented
in Wu et al. (2017) is not appropriate for the small numbers of results avail-
able at the times of predictions (<20 results). More sophisticated corrections
for small sampling estimation would be desirable. We believe our Bayesian
approach is a more suitable way to proceed in the case of this application.
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